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Introduction This report examines terrorism from the unique perspective of those who have been former members of a terrorist organization. While there is a huge body of work from various fields of expertise which examine terrorism and how to confront it from various approaches, there is very little information available about what is happening inside the organizations associated with the practice of terrorism, in particular from the former members of these organizations. It is hoped that this report will add that information to that which already exists and hopefully prompt further investigation into the issues which are raised here. The report will use the Iranian Mojahedin-e Khalq as a case study to demonstrate the findings. The report does not deal with the act of terrorism in itself, but looks instead at the perpetrators of terrorist acts. We are trying to provide some answers to the questions of how and why someone becomes a terrorist; what drives any individual to commit these heinous acts. We will address the issue of motivation. But we believe that what the terrorists tell us are their motives, or what we come to regard as their motives, gives little insight into their real mindset. The basic premise of this report is that attempting to identify and thereby to somehow remove the motives which terrorists cite to justify their actions is unhelpful at best and essentially diverts attention and resources away from the roots of the problem. While many studies have looked at the terrorist mindset from the psychological or sociological, political or historical point of view, the view expressed in this report springs largely from direct, personal experience of the terrorist mindset and more importantly how that mindset is constructed and maintained. So that rather than start with the act of terror itself and examine what is behind it, we seek to show how the deliberate construction of a particular mindset is a prerequisite to the act itself. Also, while many studies focus on the leaders and the actual perpetrators of the terrorist act and regard the organization's other members as largely irrelevant, we would argue perhaps the opposite, that the people who perform what might be regarded as mundane tasks on the periphery of the organization are actually a vital ingredient of the construct of terrorism. This is because we regard the terrorist to be made by the organization rather than being a proponent of its ideology or ideas. |